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Abstract—Over the last years, most websites on which users
can register (e.g., email providers and social networks) adopted
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart) as a countermeasure against
automated attacks. The battle of wits between designers and
attackers of CAPTCHAs led to current ones being annoying and
hard to solve for users, while still being vulnerable to automated
attacks.
In this paper, we propose CAPTCHaStar, a new image-based
CAPTCHA that relies on user interaction. This novel CAPTCHA
leverages the innate human ability to recognize shapes in a
confused environment. We assess the effectiveness of our proposal
for the two key aspects for CAPTCHAs, i.e., usability, and
resiliency to automated attacks. In particular, we evaluated the
usability, carrying out a thorough user study, and we tested the
resiliency of our proposal against several types of automated
attacks: traditional ones; designed ad-hoc for our proposal; and
based on machine learning. Compared to the state of the art,
our proposal is more user friendly (e.g., only some 35% of the
users prefer current solutions, such as text-based CAPTCHAs)
and more resilient to automated attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many public services on the Internet are subject to au-
tomated attacks, i.e., an automated program can exploit a
vulnerable on-line service, pretending to be a legitimate user.
As an example, an attacker may create multiple accounts on
an e-mail provider and use them to send spam messages.
In the last years, an increasing number of websites adopted
countermeasures against these malicious attacks. The most
common method consists in allowing access to a service only
to users able to solve a CAPTCHA (Completely Automated
Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart). The
main purpose of a CAPTCHA is to distinguish a human user
from a software robot (from now on also referred as “bot”) that
runs automated tasks. In order to do that, researchers leverage
the existing gap between human abilities and the current state
of the art of software, including also Artificial Intelligence
techniques [23]. A CAPTCHA is a program that generates a
test, which has the property to be easily solvable by humans,
but hardly solvable by a bot [40] (if not employing a significant
amount of resources and time). As an example, a bot cannot
easily understand the meaning of a sentence (or a picture),
while humans can carry out this task with negligible effort.
The design of a good CAPTCHA is not a trivial task.
Indeed, both usability to legitimate users and resiliency against
automated attacks must be simultaneously satisfied. Attackers
of CAPTCHA usually improve automated attacks over time.
For this reason, designers use to improve their CAPTCHAs in
order to reduce the success rate of novel attacks. Unfortunately,
these improvements usually cause a dramatic decrease in
usability [7]. Researchers put a significant effort in under-
standing the trade-off between usability and resiliency to
attacks [5]. Also, in order to measure the effective usability of
a CAPTCHA, Yan et al. [43] presented a set of metrics that
we also consider in this paper: success rate, completion time
and ease of understanding.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper is as follow:
• We present CAPTCHaStar1, a novel CAPTCHA based
on shape recognition and user interaction. CAPTCHaStar
prompts the user with some “stars” inside a square. The
position of these stars changes according to the position
of the cursor. The user must move the cursor, until the
stars aggregate in a recognizable shape. Our CAPTCHA
leverages the innate human ability to recognize a shape in
a confused environment. Indeed, a machine cannot easily
emulate this ability [17]. This makes CAPTCHaStar easy
solvable by humans while remaining difficult for bots.
• We assessed the usability of our proposal via a user study,
considering an extensive set of parameters. The results
show that CAPTCHaStar users achieve a success rate
higher than 90% for the best combination of parameter
values. Furthermore, humans can solve our CAPTCHA
in less than 30 seconds (on average).
• We assess the security of our proposal. In particular,
we first studied the resiliency of our CAPTCHaStar
against traditional attacks (such as exhaustion and leak
of the database). Then, we present some possible ad-hoc
attack strategies and discuss their effectiveness against
our proposal. Finally, we also assessed the resiliency of
CAPTCHaStar against attacks based on machine learn-
ing. In all these studies, our solution showed promising
results, comparable or even better than state of the art
solutions.
• We compare the features of CAPTCHaStar with other
existing CAPTCHAs. In particular, we compare our
proposal against some of the most famous image-based
designs in the literature. For each of these designs, we
discuss the protection that it offers against various attack
strategies. The results of our comparison underline that
our design improves the state of the art.
1A demo is available at http://captchastar.math.unipd.it/demo.php.
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Our work suggests that CAPTCHaStar is promising for a
practical wide adoption (particularly for mobile devices, where
the use of keyboard is more difficult and error-prone [33]), as
well as motivate further research along the same direction.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we report an overview of the current state of the art.
In Section III, we describe in details CAPTCHaStar, our novel
CAPTCHA. In Section IV, we evaluate its usability features,
while in Section V, we assess its resiliency to automated
attacks. In Section VI, we compare CAPTCHaStar with other
image-based CAPTCHAs in the literature, and we discuss
limitatons and possible future work. Finally, in Section VII,
we draw some conclusions summarizing the contributions of
our research.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the main techniques in the
literature to design CAPTCHAs, along with their pros and
cons. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive
review of the whole literature. Interested readers can refer
to the work in [37] for an extensive survey of the state
of the art. Henceforth, we refer to a single instance of a
CAPTCHA test prompted to a user with the term challenge.
In the following sections, we divide CAPTCHAs in two main
categories, according to the skill required to solve them: text-
based (Section II-A), when they require text recognition, and
image-based (Section II-B), when they challenge the user to
recognize images. For each category, we briefly describe their
usability, traditional attack strategies, and possible counter-
measures. Recently, Google proposed noCaptcha, a system
that uses an “advanced risk analysis back-end that considers
the engagement of the user” and prompts the user with either
a text-based or an image-based challenge [2]. Unfortunately,
there is not yet much technical information available (as well
as research papers) to understand how exactly it works, nor
to run a proper comparison. As far as we know, the actual
CAPTCHA prompted to the user seems independent from the
actual “risk assessment”, i.e., even CAPTCHaStar might be
used!
A. Text-based CAPTCHAs
A text-based CAPTCHA presents an obfuscated word in the
form of an image, and asks the user to read and rewrite it, usu-
ally in a text box. Baird et al. [3] proposed the first text-based
CAPTCHA in 2002. After this first proposal, several other
researchers worked on this kind of design. Several researchers
focused on improving the resiliency against automated at-
tacks [4], [12], [18]. Currently, text-based CAPTCHAs are the
most widely used [8]. In the following, we report two examples
of text-based CAPTCHAs that, as for CAPTCHaStar, do not
require a keyboard to submit the answer: iCaptcha [39] and
DDIM-CAPTCHA [44].
The authors of iCaptcha [39] focused their efforts on the
prevention of relay attacks [26]: i.e., when a bot uses an
external paid human to solve a CAPTCHA. This text-based
CAPTCHA measures and analyzes the interactions a user
performs while solving the challenge. iCaptcha prompts the
user with a classical obfuscated word. For each word, there
is a sequence of obfuscated letters that the user has to use
to compose her answer. iCaptcha verification operates on two
fronts. First, the correctness of the answer discriminates a real
human from a machine. Second, the interleaving time after
the tap of each button discriminates a legitimate user from
an external paid human. However, we consider this type of
discrimination weak, because the latency of the network con-
nection can heavily affect the measurement of the interleaving
times. Moreover, iCaptcha presents the user a small set of
candidate characters (i.e., the set of buttons) that composes
the solution of the challenge. Unfortunately, while this feature
improves usability, it also increases the success rate of attacks
that leverage OCR (Optical Character Recognition) software.
The CAPTCHA design proposed by Ye et al. [44] (named
DDIM-CAPTCHA) also leverages obfuscated words like tra-
ditional text-based schemes. The main difference with the
previous design is in the way the user can solve a challenge:
instead of asking the user to type the answer, this CAPTCHA
asks to drag the correct letters from a pool into an “answer
box”. Letters in the pool overlap to each other, so the user has
to constantly interact with the pool to pick the letter he wants.
a) Usability features: The first implementations of text-
based CAPTCHAs had a very short completion time and
high success rate for legitimate users. Unfortunately, the in-
troduction of countermeasures to new automated attacks have
dramatically lowered these usability features, highlighting the
need for new designs [13]. The instructions to solve text-
based CAPTCHAs are really easy to understand. Indeed,
they usually do not need any a-priori knowledge from the
users, except for the ability to read. Users need to type the
answer using a keyboard, except for particular designs (e.g.,
iCaptcha [39]). Unfortunately, inputting the answer with a key-
board undermine the usability of a CAPTCHA on smartphone
or tablet. Indeed, in such devices, a single-handed touch-based
interaction style is dominant [31].
b) Attacks and countermeasures: The most common way
to automatically solve text-based CAPTCHAs is to use an
OCR (Optical Character Recognition) software. In the past few
years, CAPTCHAs designers and attackers took part in a battle
of wits. This battle led to an improvement of OCR software,
hence making OCR a very effective threat [9] to text-based
CAPTCHAs. Another effective approach to solve CAPTCHA
is the so-called relay attack: some companies sells real-time
human labor to solve CAPTCHAs [26]. This approach has a
really high success rate and it costs only one U.S. dollar per
thousand CAPTCHAs [7].
Looking at the literature, the attack strategies against text-
based CAPTCHAs can be classified as follows:
A01) Forward the challenge to paid or unaware humans that
solve it (i.e., relay attack).
A02) In case the answer is a word of sense, use OCR
technology combined with a dictionary.
A03) Use OCR software on a single character separately.
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A04) Segment the word, in order to obtain a single image
for every character.
A05) Remove smaller lines that can be added as an obstacle
to the segmentation process.
A06) Fill hollow spaces inside each character, to improve
OCR effectiveness.
A07) Repair characters outline by fixing broken lines. This
method leverages on analyzing the distance between
pixels.
Attackers may combine two or more of these attack strategies
in order to achieve a higher success rate.
CAPTCHA designers reacted to these attacks proposing
several improvements to mitigate their effectiveness. Some
examples follow (between parenthesis we indicate the attack
for which the mitigation strategy could be effective):
• Add more layers of interaction between user and
CAPTCHA (could be effective for threat A01 above).
• Add more distortion to the letters, e.g., warping, scaling,
rotating (against A02 and A06).
• Use of English-like words (for the sake of usability) or
totally random words (against A03).
• Add more pollution to the image, e.g., ticker lines over
the letters, confusing background (against A04 and A05).
• Increment noise, e.g., degrading the quality of the result-
ing image (against A07).
Unfortunately, some of these mitigation strategies have been
shown to be ineffective [10], [6].
B. Image-based CAPTCHAs
Image-based CAPTCHAs usually ask the user to recognize
an image or to interact with on-screen objects to find a
solution. Unlike text-based CAPTCHAs, every image-based
design is substantially different from each other. For this
reason, a user who faces a CAPTCHA design for the first time
needs a little more effort to understand how it works. Studies
suggest that image-based CAPTCHAs are more appreciated
by users [14]. Indeed, image-based CAPTCHAs usually have
a high success rate and they are less challenging than text-
based ones [27]. In the following, we report some examples
of image-based CAPTCHA that we could group in three sub-
categories: static, motion, and interactive.
One of the representative static image-based CAPTCHAs
was Asirra [11], which was discontinued in fall 2014. Asirra
asks the user to distinguish between cats and dogs, on twelve
different photos randomly taken from an external website.
Another static image-based CAPTCHA is Collage [35]: it
requests to click on a specific picture, among six pictures
randomly taken. Deep CAPTCHA [27] prompts the user with
six 3D models of real world objects and it asks to sort them
by their size.
Some designers focus on CAPTCHA that requires video
recognition rather than static image recognition. For example,
Motion CAPTCHA [36] shows the user a randomly chosen
video from a database, then it asks the user to identify
the action performed by the person in the video. Similarly,
YouTube Videos CAPTCHA [20] leverages on real video in
YouTube service, and it asks the user to write three tags related
to the content of the video.
Interactive CAPTCHAs mitigate the relay attack threat. For
example, Noise CAPTCHA [29] presents a transparent noisy
image overlapped to a noisy background. The user needs to
drag this image until he can recognize a well formed text.
Cursor CAPTCHA [38] changes the appearance of mouse
cursor into another random object. The user needs to overlap
the cursor on the identical object placed in a random generated
image. Jigsaw CAPTCHA [14] reprises the classical jigsaw
puzzle. Indeed, the user needs to correctly rearrange the pieces
of a jigsaw. Finally, PlayThru [1] asks the user to solve a
randomly generated mini-game. These mini-games require to
drag objects on their correct spots.
c) Usability features: Since image-based CAPTCHAs
are different from each other, the usability may change
depending on the considered design. Usually, image-based
CAPTCHAs do not require to type on a keyboard. For
this reason, smartphone and tablet users prefer image-based
CAPTCHAs over text-based ones [33]. The instructions for
each different CAPTCHA design are usually short and intu-
itive. Finally, on the server-side, resources required and setup
time should be as small as possible. However, some image-
based CAPTCHAs need many external libraries and may
require a large amount of computational power (for example,
the design proposed in [45] requires more than two minutes
to generate a single challenge).
d) Attacks and countermeasures: The attacks designed to
automatically solve image-based CAPTCHAs are usually very
specific, i.e., the attacker has to exploit weak points of each
specific CAPTCHA design. The main attack strategies used
against image-based CAPTCHAs are the following (to avoid
confusion and have a unique numbering for attack strategies—
also considering the ones for text-based CAPTCHAs—we
continue from A08):
A08) Some CAPTCHAs (especially the ones based on
games) hide the solution on client-side. Henceforth,
an attacker might run what we call indirect attack:
get the solution from the client-side (e.g., via reverse
engineering of the client application).
A09) Some CAPTCHAs rely on a pool of pre-computed
challenges, stored in a database. A malicious attacker
can perform the exhaustion of the database using real
humans (e.g., via Amazon Mechanical Turk2).
A10) Similarly, an attacker can make queries to a leaked
database to identify the solution of a challenge.
A11) An attacker can use machine learning techniques (e.g.,
Support Vector Machine) to recognize the objects that
compose a challenge and solve it.
A12) In case of a limited number of possible answers,
an attacker could simply rely on a random chance
obtaining a decent success rate.
2https://www.mturk.com/.
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A13) CAPTCHAs solvable with a single interaction are
prone to pure relay attacks. Indeed, attackers can sim-
ply send a screenshot of the challenge to an external
paid human.
A14) Given a heavily interactive CAPTCHA, a bot can
synchronously relay the data stream from the server
over to a human solver, and then relay back the input
of the user to the server. This strategy is defined as
stream relay attack [25].
Several improvements are possible to mitigate the previous
weaknesses. Some examples follow:
• Use code obfuscation or encryption (against A08).
• Use Web crawlers to have a self-growing database
(against A09).
• Process objects stored in the database before presenting
them in the challenge. This makes it unfeasible to match
the original object with the one presented in the challenge
(against A09 and A10).
• Enlarge the search space in order to increase the compu-
tational cost to find a solution (against A11).
• Increase the number of possible answers (against A12).
• Analyze the behavioral features, identifying suspicious
pattern of movement [24] (against A13 and A14).
III. OUR PROPOSAL: CAPTCHASTAR
In this section, we present CAPTCHaStar, a novel image-
based CAPTCHA. The aim of our proposal is to provide
a high level of usability, while improving security. In the
following, we first provide a high level overview of the system
(Section III-A), then we discuss the actual implementation of
the prototype (Section III-B).
A. CAPTCHaStar overview
Our CAPTCHA prompts the user with several small white
squares, randomly placed inside a squared black space. From
now on, we refer to a single white square as a star, and to
the squared black space as the drawable space. The position
of each star changes according to the current coordinates of
the cursor, inside the drawable space. Given a challenge, we
define as state a snapshot of the stars location on the drawable
space, relative to a specific cursor position. The challenge asks
the user (who wants to be recognized as a human) to change
the position of the stars, by moving her cursor, until she is able
to recognize a shape (which is not predictable). In particular,
CAPTCHaStar creates such a shape starting from a picture
randomly chosen among a huge set of pictures. Figure 1a
illustrates an example of a picture with ideal features: two
colors and a limited number of small details.
Our system decomposes the selected picture in several stars
using a sampling algorithm (described later in Section III-B).
For each star, the system sets its movement pattern, in a way
such that the stars can aggregate together, forming the shape
of the sampled picture. This happens only when the cursor is
on a secret position. We refer to that position as the solution
of the challenge. In general, a single CAPTCHaStar challenge
can include more than one shape, each of them having its own
solution (i.e., secret position of the cursor), at which becomes
visible.
When the position of the cursor is far from the solution, the
stars appear randomly scattered on the black space. Figure 1b
shows an example, obtained from the stars that compose the
picture in Figure 1a. The user has to move the cursor inside
the drawable space until she recognizes a meaningful shape.
As the distance between the cursor and the solution decreases
significantly, the stars aggregate together in a more and more
detailed shape (see Figure 1c). The user needs to adjust the
position of the cursor, until she is confident that the resulting
shape is detailed enough (see Figure 1d). Finally, the user
confirms the current cursor position as her final answer. The
system compares the solution with the final answer (allowing
a small margin of error), eventually assessing whether the
interaction was made by human.
To make the solution of the CAPTCHA more difficult for a
bot, in addition to the stars forming the original shape (original
stars), we add also noisy stars: i.e., stars that will be in random
position when the shape is complete. The number of the noisy
stars can be tuned according to a specific parameter.
The system stores on server-side the solution of the chal-
lenge, and performs the check only when the user confirms
her answer, that is considered as final and irrevocable. For the
sake of usability, CAPTCHaStar considers as a valid answer
also a pair of coordinates that is close enough to the actual
solution (more details in Section III-B).
The generation phase of a challenge involves some param-
eters to tune usability and security:
• Noise (ψ): the percentage of noisy stars added to the
scheme, with respect to the number of original stars.
• Sensitivity (δ): the relationship between the amount of
displacement of the cursor (in pixel) and the movement
of each star (more details in Section III-B).
• NSol: the number of possible solutions (i.e., secret po-
sitions) of the challenge. Each solution corresponds to a
different shape.
• PicSize: the maximum value between width and height
on the sampled picture, expressed in number of pixels.
• Rotation: Boolean value that indicates whether the picture
is rotated by a random degree.
B. Prototype implementation
To assess the feasibility and effectiveness of our solution,
we did a complete implementation. In particular, we aimed at
providing an implementation that could be widely deployed.
Since PHP is the most supported programming language by
web servers [41], we implemented the server-side part of our
design using this language. We implemented the client-side
part using HTML5 Canvas, because it has the support for
majority of commercial browsers [15]. We manually retrieved
more than 5000 pictures with two colors, by searching free-
to-use collections3 of vector icons in .png format (this step
could be automated, e.g., with web crawlers). We collected
3Free vector icons, http://www.flaticon.com/.
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(a) A random starting picture. (b) A sample unsolved challenge. (c) An almost solved challenge. (d) A correctly solved challenge.
Fig. 1: The process of solving a CAPTCHaStar challenge.
all these pictures in a pool. For a real life deployment of that
system, we recommend using a pool as large as possible. In
the following, we first describe how a challenge is generated
on the server-side, then we describe how it is presented to the
user on the client-side.
1) Generation of a challenge: Each challenge is composed
by original stars (generated from the base shape) and noisy
stars (generated randomly). The steps to generate a challenge
are as follows: i) Picture selection and pre-process; ii) Pic-
ture decomposition; iii) Trajectory computation. Our system
repeats these steps for a number of times equal to the value
of the parameter NSol.
Picture selection and pre-process. Our system randomly
chooses one of the pictures from the pool, and resizes it
according to the value of the parameter PicSize. If the Rotation
parameter is enabled, CAPTCHaStar rotates the picture by a
random degree. At this point, our system converts the picture
in black and white (i.e., binarization).
Picture decomposition. The sampling algorithm first divides
the picture in 5x5 pixel tiles, then it counts the number of
black pixels inside each tile. A tile will result in an original
star when it matches one of the following conditions: (i) if
the tile is filled with black pixels (i.e., having 5x5 = 25 black
pixels), our system generates an original star and places it at
the center of the tile; (ii) if the tile has a number of black
pixels between 9 and 24, our system generates an original star
and places it in a position that is shifted from the center of
the tile, toward the position where there are the majority of
black pixels. Our system places the final shape composed by
stars inside the drawable space, in a random position (such
that all the original stars lie inside).
Trajectory computation. We define the solution sol of the
challenge as the pair of coordinates (solx, soly). Our system
generates solx and soly at random, within the range of [5, 295].
We adopted such range for the sake of usability. In particular,
this guarantees that the solution will not appear on the edges of
the drawable area (which is 300x300 pixel). For each original
star i, our system also defines (P ix, P
i
y) as the coordinates
of the position that the star i takes when the cursor is in
coordinates (solx, soly). For each star i, our system randomly
generates four coefficients (mix,x, m
i
x,y , m
i
y,x, m
i
y,y), that
relates the coordinates of the star with the coordinates of the
cursor: miab associates the coordinate of the star i in axis a,
with the coordinate of the cursor in axis b. The values of
these coefficients are picked in the range [− δ10 , δ10 ] (we remind
that δ is the sensitivity value). Our system computes a pair of
constants, (Cix, C
i
y), for each original star i as follows:
Cix = P
i
x − soly ·mix,y − solx ·mix,x,
Ciy = P
i
y − soly ·miy,y − solx ·miy,x.
CAPTCHaStar generates the noisy stars in a similar way,
but their coordinates (Px, Py) having random values. The
number of noisy stars is equal to the percentage ψ of the
number of original stars. Henceforth, we define as trajectories
parameters of star i, the following set of parameters: mix,x,
mix,y , C
i
x, m
i
y,x, m
i
y,y, C
i
y . The only information that the client
needs from the server in order to calculate the position of the
stars, whenever the user moves her cursor, is the trajectories
parameters. We underline that noisy and original stars are
mixed together, i.e., they are indistinguishable from client side.
2) Presentation of a challenge: Whenever the user moves
the cursor, our system uses the cursor coordinates cur =
(curx, cury) to compute the new coordinates of each star i,
as follows:
xi = mix,y · cury +mix,x · curx + Cix,
yi = miy,x · curx +miy,y · cury + Ciy.
When the user confirms her answer (e.g., with a mouse click),
the client passes cur to a simple server-side script, via HTTP
GET parameter. For the sake of usability, on mobile devices
the submission of the answer is performed by tapping on a
button, which is external to the drawable space.
Our server-side script calculates ∆ as the euclidean distance
between sol and cur. We define usability tolerance as a
threshold, in terms of euclidean distance from sol. When the
value ∆ is below the usability tolerance, the system considers
the test as passed (failed otherwise). From our experiments,
we found that a reasonable value for usability tolerance is
close to five (more details in Section IV-A). We highlight that
the position of each star varies linearly with the movement of
the cursor. For this reason, humans can easily build a mental
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map [28] of the stars’ behavior, hence moving the cursor
toward the position that is closer to a real shape.
C. System performance
In this section, we discuss the performance of our proposal
in terms of computational time and bandwidth. The perfor-
mance is directly related to the number of stars in a challenge.
In Figure 2, we report the probability density of the number
of stars in a challenge, computed from our database with
4033 challenges. This probability density results in a Normal
Density Curve with mean µ = 542.7 and standard deviation
σ = 314.4. According with this finding, for a CAPTCHaStar
challenge with an average number of stars (i.e., 543 stars), the
server sends to the client 12.7 kB (i.e., 4 bytes for each one of
the six parameters). In Figure 3, we report the distribution of
network overheads caused by the request of a CAPTCHaStar
challenge. We can observe that more of the 75% of the
challenges are smaller than 17 kB. We underline that in out
current prototype implementation, the parameters are passed
without any compression, while a compression could reduce
the amount of Bytes transmitted. As a comparison with the
existing CAPTCHAs, we point out that a text-based reCaptcha
challenge sends some 3 kB, while an image-based reCaptcha
challenge sends some 35 kB. As an additional example, a
single Asirra challenge needs more than 360 kB.
Fig. 2: Probability distribution of the number of stars.
Fig. 3: Statistical distribution of the sizes of the challenges in
kilobytes. The notch of the box represents the median value.
First and third quartile are represented as the left and right side
of the notched box. Lines that extend horizontally from the
boxes indicate the 2nd percentile (left) and the 98th percentile
(right).
The server we use to generate the challenges is a PC with
a 3.0 GHz AMD Athlon Dual Core Processor and 1 GB of
RAM. In Figure 4, we report the average time required by
each phase of our solution to generate a challenge described
above, depending on the number of stars. As we can see
from Figure 4, the most costly phase of the process is the
picture decomposition phase, i.e., the generation of the original
stars by sampling the starting image. This phase takes some
76% of the overall time to generate a challenge. The picture
selection and pre-process phase (i.e., loading, rotating and
resizing the image) requires around 21% of the overall time.
Only some 3% of the overall challenge generation time is due
to the trajectory computation phase. Considering the average
challenge (i.e., 542 stars), the overall time required to generate
such challenge is about 0.75 seconds. We underline that even
in the worst case scenario, the overall time is always lower
than two seconds. This suggests that our prototype can handle
efficiently a wide number of requests, even with low cost
hardware resources. Moreover, we believe the generation time
would in no way be a showstopper for CAPTCHAs (and for
our proposal in particular), since a possible solution (indeed
applicable to several CAPTCHAs) would be either to generate
the challenge while the user is doing other operations, or to
maintain a pool of pre-generated challenges, and randomly
pick one when needed.
Fig. 4: Challenge generation time.
D. User interaction
For the sake of usability of CAPTCHaStar, we consider
different cursors according to the device it runs on. In particu-
lar, considering a browser on a personal computer, the cursor
coincides with the default mouse pointer, and the user can
submit her final answer by clicking the left mouse button. On
the other hand, on smartphones or other touch-enabled devices,
the cursor position is usually not represented with a graphical
object, such as the mouse pointer on personal computers. For
this reason, we represent the cursor position as a red arrow
inside the drawable area (as shown in Figure 5). The user can
move the cursor by swiping her finger on the drawable area
(note that only the starting point of the swipe must be inside
6
the drawable area). In Figure 5a, we report a first example of
a user moving the cursor from position P1 to P2, by swiping
the finger from T1 to T2 on the touchscreen. In Figure 5b,
we show a second example, where the starting position P3 of
the cursor corresponds to the ending position P2 in Figure 5a.
In the second example, a user moves the cursor from position
P3 to P4, with a swipe from T3 to T4. We highlight that the
path of the cursor is mapped directly to the path of the swipe,
regardless of the starting point of that swipe. Moreover, the
position of the cursor at the end of the swipe in Figure 5a
(i.e., T2) remains in position P2.
In order to submit her final answer on a mobile browser,
the user has to tap on a “CHECK” link placed outside of the
drawable area, as shown at the top of figures 5a and 5b.
(a) First interaction. (b) Second interaction.
Fig. 5: User interaction examples on touchscreen devices.
IV. USER STUDY
In order to evaluate our proposal, we ran a user study
according to the usability metrics proposed in [43], and an
exhaustive set of parameter combinations. In particular, we
compare our solution with text-based CAPTCHAs taken from
reCaptcha [32]. In the following, we describe in detail how
we ran the user study and discuss the obtained results.
A. Parameters selection
In order to notify the user whether she passes or fails a
challenge, we need to set the value of the usability tolerance
parameter (introduced in Section III-B). On one hand, increas-
ing the value of this parameter makes CAPTCHaStar more
permissive. On the other hand, it also increases the success
rate of random guess attacks with a quadratic growth. For
this reason, it was crucial to identify an optimal value for the
usability tolerance parameter, in order to obtain a good trade-
off between usability and security.
We ran this preliminary study on a set of 35 participants
(volunteers and without any reward) under our supervision. A
session of this study consisted in solving three CAPTCHaStar
tests (named P1, P2 and P3) for at least two times (i.e.,
six challenges in total). CAPTCHaStar tests are randomly
generated using the parameter values reported in Table I.
Figure 6 reports the success rate of the participants and
success rate of random guess attacks, as the usability tolerance
Test P1 P2 P3
ψ 0% 70% 70%
δ 5 7 7
NSol 1 1 1
Rotation Off Off On
TABLE I: Values of parameters ψ, δ, NSol and Rotation for
the preliminary study.
Fig. 6: Success rate of the participants of the preliminary study
(scale on the left-hand side of the graph) and success rate
of random guess attack (scale on the right-hand side of the
graph), varying the value of usability tolerance.
Test T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
ψ 0% 70% 70% 10% 0% 250%
δ 5 7 7 7 10 5
NSol 1 1 1 2 3 1
Rotation Off Off On Off Off Off
Usability tolerance 5 5 5 5 5 5
TABLE II: Values of parameters ψ, δ, NSol, Rotation and
Usability tolerance for the survey.
varies. In particular, we noticed that the participants success
rate grows rapidly until usability tolerance is equal to five,
then it plateaus. Since the random guess attack success rate
grows very fast (i.e., has a quadratic growth), and the user
success rate does not improve significantly with a usability
tolerance greater than five, for our user study (described in
the following) we set the usability tolerance equal to five.
B. Survey design and implementation
We designed a web-based survey page, in order to collect
data from a large number of participants. We built a survey
composed of eight different tests: six CAPTCHaStar chal-
lenges (named from T1 to T6) and two text-based ones (T7 and
T8). Tests from T1 to T6 are randomly generated (i.e., starting
from a random image) using the value of parameters reported
in Table II. Tests T4 and T5 have more than one solutions, i.e.,
two and three, respectively. Test T4 requires the user to find
both of its solutions, while for T5, it is enough to find only
one of the three existing solutions. In Figure 7, we present
some examples of solved challenges for the settings from T1
to T6.
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(a) T1 (b) T2
(c) T3 (d) T4
(e) T5 (f) T6
Fig. 7: Screenshots of examples of solved challenges, gener-
ated randomly using the settings from T1 to T6.
The last two tests are random text-based CAPTCHAs from
reCaptcha, with one and two words (i.e., T7 and T8, re-
spectively). In order to minimize the learning effect [21], we
prompt the user with the eight tests selected in a random
order. At the beginning of the survey, we prompt users with
a description of our proposal and a simple demo. Then, we
ask the participants to fill out a form with their demographic
information: age, gender, nationality, level of education, years
passed using Internet, and frequency of Internet use. We
gather this data in order to understand whether factors like
the experience of the user affects the performances in solving
CAPTCHaStar challenges. In the same page, we also ask the
participants to read and accept an informed consent statement,
where we declare how we intend to use the collected data and
that we do not intend to disclose private information to third
parties. For each test in the survey, we ask the user to rate the
perceived difficulty of that test on a scale from 1 to 5. At the
end of the eighth test, we asked the participants to: (i) rate the
ease of understanding; (ii) indicate if they prefer our proposal
or text-based CAPTCHAs; (iii) leave us any suggestion. We
design this survey in a way that each session should last less
than 10 minutes.
C. Participants
All the participants took the survey unsupervised using their
own devices, in order to recreate the natural conditions of use
of CAPTCHaStar. We recruited the participants with an invita-
tion (including a public link to the survey) that we broadcast on
mailing lists and on social networks (i.e., Facebook, Google+,
Twitter, and LinkedIn), in order to collect usage data for a
large number of participants. We did not give any reward for
the participation. More than 250 users took part in our survey
(258 users, 81% male and 19% female). We made sure that
none of the 35 participants of the preliminary study took part
to this user study. The average age of the participants was
25.5. The education level was distributed as follows: 32% high
school diploma, 29% bachelor degree, 26% master degree,
9% PhD, and 4% none of the previous ones. The totality
of the participants used Internet daily, 49% from 5 to 10
years, 33% for more than 10 to 15 years, 28% for more than
15 years. The majority (some 90%) of the participants were
Italians. However, we did not notice significant differences
in the performance of users of different nationalities. Finally,
only a few participants used mobile devices (16 users), with
performances similar to desktop users.
D. Results and discussion
Among all the participants, only 35% of them preferred
traditional CAPTCHAs rather than CAPTCHaStar. Table III
reports the success rate and the average solving time for each
of the eight challenges described above.
CAPTCHaStar Text
Test T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
Succ. Rate (%) 78.7 90.2 90.6 50.4 85.1 76.6 62.7 46.9
Difficulty 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.4 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.7
Succ. Avg (s) 14.4 17.5 22.2 54.1 30.2 28.5 11.0 14.9Std 9.8 9.3 15.8 33.5 20.2 19.7 5.4 6.1
Fail Avg (s) 14.7 18.2 33.1 49.0 38.8 40.0 12.6 21.2Std 13.5 10.7 21.2 33.5 26.6 25.6 8.8 17.8
TABLE III: Survey results for CAPTCHaStar and text-based
(Text) CAPTCHAs.
In most cases, when considering failed tests, the average
completion time is higher than successfully passed ones. In
general, the standard deviation of these completion times is
quite high (more than 25 for most of the tests): a possible
reason for this could be users having different abilities in
solving CAPTCHaStar challenges. We highlight that all the
CAPTCHaStar tests (i.e., T1 to T6) have a success rate higher
than the one of T8 (i.e., text-based with two words), and only
for T4 the success rate is lower than the one of T7 (i.e., text-
based with one word). We believe that users found T4 more
difficult to be solved because it requires to discover two images
(i.e., original stars for two images, plus the noisy stars). In
particular, T2 shows a success rate that is some 90%, which
is higher than the 84% for text-based CAPTCHAs reported
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(a) Success rates over time.
(b) Fail rates over time.
Fig. 8: Success and fail rate over time.
in [7]. We underline that in our text-based CAPTCHAs T7
and T8 (where we used current reCaptcha used by Google),
we observed a success rate of 62.7% (for the simpler test with
only one word). In figures 8a and 8b, we report in the domain
of time the percentages of the participants that solved and
failed a challenge, respectively.
We highlight that text-based challenges (T7 and T8) rapidly
approach to their maximum within some 20 seconds, while
CAPTCHaStar challenges reach a higher success rate in just
a few more seconds. Indeed, the average time to solve T2 is
some 17 seconds, which is some 6 seconds higher than the
best time for text-based CAPTCHAs (i.e., 11 seconds for T7).
We believe that this is an acceptable value.
In order to validate the choice of the usability tolerance
value, we report in Figure 9 a chart that now takes into
account the data obtained from the main user study. This chart
confirms our choice of five as being a reasonable value of
usability tolerance. In fact, increasing the usability tolerance
(which also means giving more chances to adversaries) to a
value above 5, brings only a limited benefit in the participants
success rate – see how the slope of most curves varies at
usability tolerance equal to 5.
Finally, we asked users to rate the “ease of understanding”
of the system on a scale from 1 (very simple) to 10 (very
Fig. 9: Success rate of the participants of the main user study
(scale on the left-hand side of the graph) and success rate
of random guess attack (scale on the right-hand side of the
graph), varying the value of usability tolerance.
difficult), and the results show an average value of 4.53,
with standard deviation of 2.53. In general, the comments
received from the participants were positive. In particular,
more than one gave comments similar to the following: “I
think CAPTCHaStar is better than text-based CAPTCHAs
because it’s a kind of game”. Other participants said something
like “text-based CAPTCHAs may require less time than yours,
but I prefer CAPTCHaStar because I actually enjoyed it”.
E. Learning effect evaluation
Furthermore, we underline that in our user study, users were
never trained before to solve our CAPTCHA, while trained
users might need a smaller amount of time to solve CAPTCHa-
Star. To verify this claim, we analyzed the performance of 25
users that repeated the whole survey (i.e., tests from T1 to T8)
at least three times. The results of this analysis are reported
in Figure 10.
From Figure 10, we can observe that these users improved
their performance to solve CAPTCHaStar challenges as they
repeated the survey (i.e., increasing the success rate and
decreasing of the completion time), while their performance
on text-based challenges (T7 and T8) remained quite the
same. These preliminary results indicate that as users gain
more confidence with CAPTCHaStar, the completion time
significantly decreases.
V. RESILIENCY TO AUTOMATED ATTACKS
An important feature of a good CAPTCHA is the resiliency
to automated attacks. In the following, we investigate the
resiliency of our proposal against several attacks, such as:
traditional attacks (Section V-A); automated attacks using ad-
hoc heuristics (Section V-B) and attacks based on machine
learning (Section V-C).
A. Traditional attacks
In this section, we discuss how CAPTCHaStar withstands
traditional attack strategies for CAPTCHAs (we listed those
strategies in Section II-B).
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(a) Success rate.
(b) Completion time.
Fig. 10: Learning effect on repeating the survey.
• Indirect Attack (A08): An indirect attack is not feasible,
since all the information about the solution are not
available on the client-side. CAPTCHaStar generates the
challenge randomly on the server-side, and passes to the
client only the description of the behavior of each star
with respect to the current cursor position. We remind that
the coordinates (solx, soly), corresponding to the solution
of the challenge, are never revealed to the client. Our
system checks the correctness of the final answer on the
server-side, only after the user confirms it.
• Exhaustion of Database (A09): Our system generates a
challenge starting from a .png picture, randomly chosen
among more than five thousand candidates. Moreover,
this database can be automatically enriched with the help
of a web crawler, but we consider this as a future work.
• Leak of Database (A10): An attacker who tries to match
a challenge with its original picture faces a more complex
problem than actually solving the challenge. Indeed, the
attacker has to solve the challenge in order to input the
complete shape to a matching algorithm. Moreover, we
highlight that during the generation phase the system
alters the original picture, as described in Section III-A.
• Machine Learning (A11): In order to understand the
feasibility of this attack, we actually trained a classifier to
beat our CAPTCHA. Results suggest that this approach
could be a serious threat, but it needs an unpractical
amount of time and resources to be performed. We
provide more detailed study about this specific attack in
Section V-C.
• Random Choice (A12): For the sake of usability,
CAPTCHaStar also accepts as a correct answer the neigh-
borhood of the solution (according to the value of usabil-
ity tolerance parameter). Nevertheless, the probability of
success of a random guess is some 0.09% with usability
tolerance equal to 5.
• Pure Relay Attack (A13): The solution discovery requires
constant interaction with the CAPTCHA. For this reason,
a single screenshot sent to a third party is surely not
enough to put a relay attack into practice.
• Stream Relay Attack (A14): As we introduced in Sec-
tion II-B, a stream relay attack needs to synchronously
stream the current state to a human third party.
CAPTCHaStar needs a constant and immediate feedback
system on each cursor movement. Streaming a large num-
ber of frames over a (usually) slow connection between
the bot and the solvers machine may reduce solving
accuracy and increase the response time. Unfortunately,
this attack strategy remains the most effective against
CAPTCHAs (including our proposal).
B. Automated attacks using ad-hoc heuristics
In this section, we describe the design of a CAPTCHaStar
automatic solver, in order to deeply test the reliability of our
design. While retrieving all the possible states of a challenge is
a trivial task (an attacker can simply take a snapshot for each
cursor position), identifying the specific state corresponding to
the solution is not simple. Indeed, the core task of an automatic
solver is to recognize the presence of a shape in a given state.
In the following, we report some ad-hoc heuristics we came
up with to perform this task (of course, we cannot exclude
better solutions that could be proposed in the future).
We created a program capable of generating every possible
state, and assign a score to each state using a heuristic.
Given a state, the aim of the heuristic is to quantify the
dispersion of the stars. We consider as a candidate solution the
state that minimizes the score given by the applied heuristic.
The total number of states that the automatic solver has to
evaluate is equal to 84100 (i.e., 2902). In order to achieve the
highest possible success rate, we chose to consider the whole
research space, instead of a sub-sample. The computational
cost of the attack can be really high, depending on the
implemented heuristic. We implemented the automatic solver
and the heuristics described below using the C programming
language. For each heuristic, we evaluate the automatic solver
in terms of success rate and average execution time for at least
250 challenges. For this evaluation, we use the same value of
parameters as in test T2 in the usability survey in Section IV
(we chose these parameters since test T2 was the test with the
highest success rate). In this evaluation, we used a PC with a
2.3 GHz Intel Pentium B970 and 4 GB memory.
1) Minimize height/width of stars (MinSize): We define
with Sk the challenge state generated when the cursor is in
position k, in coordinates (xk, yk). We also consider xs and ys
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the x and y coordinates, respectively, of star s. The heuristic
is defined as follows:
MinSize(k) =
(
max
s∈Sk
xs − min
s∈Sk
xs
)
+
(
max
s∈Sk
ys − min
s∈Sk
ys
)
.
When ψ = 0%, this heuristic has more than 90% of
success rate. The addition of a few noisy stars to the challenge
completely nullify the effectiveness of this heuristic (i.e.,
success rate of 0% with only two noisy stars). The algorithm
has a very low computational cost. We recorded an average
execution time of 10 seconds.
2) Minimize the distribution (MinDistribution): The main
idea under this heuristic consists of dividing the drawable
space into tiles. Indeed, this heuristic evaluates the stars
dispersion on each tile singularly. Henceforth, we define a
matrix Mk as the matrix of pixels in the drawable area, after
the drawing process of the state Sk. Each cell is defined as
follows:
Mki,j =
{
1 if pixel (i, j) is white;
0 otherwise.
We divide Mk in a set T k of 144 squared tiles (i.e., t ∈ T k is
a sub-matrix of Mk), each with a side of 25 pixels. We define
the score of a single tile t ∈ T k as:
fscore(t) = |2 ·
25∑
i=1
25∑
j=1
tij − 252|.
The heuristic is defined as:
MinDistr(k) =
∑
t∈Tk
fscore(t).
The value of the sensitivity parameter (δ) heavily affects the
effectiveness of this heuristic. Indeed, when ψ = 70%, the
attack that uses this heuristic achieves a success rate of 2.7%,
with δ = 5. On the other hand, the success rate significantly
decreases to 0.07%, when we increase the value of δ to 7. The
computational cost of this heuristic is slightly higher than the
previously discussed MinSize. The average time is 65 seconds.
3) Minimize the sum of distances (MinSumDist): This
heuristic aims to detect when stars are clustered together,
even in different groups. We define d(s1, s2) as the euclidean
distance between the stars s1 and s2. The heuristic is defined
as follows:
MinSumDist(k) =
∑
s∈Sk
min
r∈Sk
d(s, r).
When ψ = 70% and δ = 7, the success rate of this strategy
is 0.56%. The computational cost of this heuristic is higher
than MinDistribution: we observed an average execution time
of 12 minutes and 45 seconds.
4) Minimize the sum of all distances (AllSumDist): We
modify the previously discussed heuristic in order to consider
all distances. The heuristic is defined as:
AllSumDist(k) =
∑
s∈Sk
∑
r∈Sk
d(s, r).
This heuristic is the most effective, with a success rate of
1.92% on ψ = 70% and δ = 7. However, this heuristic
has a very high computational cost. We recorded an average
execution time of more than 25 minutes. Using sampling pairs
on this algorithm would reduce the search space, and thus
the execution time. However, we underline that this attack
will remain useless, since its performance is less than 2% of
success. We expect that the use of sampling pairs would further
reduce this success rate.
In Figure 11a and Figure 11b, we report how the success
rates of the heuristics described above vary at the change
of parameters δ and ψ. From Figure 11a, we observe that
for ψ = 70%, the success rate is always smaller than 3%.
From Figure 11b, we observe that with a small level of noise
the success rate would be significant (i.e., 40% for ψ = 10
and δ = 7). However, increasing the noise level effectively
mitigates this problem (i.e., for δ = 7 and ψ > 50%, the
success rate is always smaller than 5%).
From Table IV, we observe that even if the variation of
execution time is very high (from 10 seconds of MinSize, to
1500 of AllSumDist ones), the success rate is always smaller
than 2%.
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Fig. 11: Comparison of success rates on variations of δ and ψ.
Strategy MinSize MinDistribution MinSumDist AllSumDist
Time (s) 10 65 765 1500
Succ. Rate 0.00% 0.07% 0.50% 1.92%
TABLE IV: Execution time and Success (ψ = 70%; δ = 7).
C. Attacks based on machine learning
In order to assess the resiliency of CAPTCHaStar against
machine learning-based attacks, we designed a tool that tries
to find the solution of a challenge. We implemented this tool
using scikit-learn libraries [30]. In the following, we report in
details how we built such tool. In particular, in Section V-C1,
we introduce the methodology we followed to extract features
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from a challenge state; in Section V-C2, we explain the
training phase of the classifiers; and in Section V-C3, we
describe the actual attack and we evaluate its performance.
1) Features extraction: We recall that given a state Sk, we
obtain its Boolean matrix Mk, as defined in Section V-B. A
classifier is a supervised learning algorithm [22] that requires
a training set. The examples in the training set are labeled
with the class they belong to. After the training phase, a
classifier should be able to identify to which class a new
unlabeled example belongs. All the examples must have a fixed
number of features. Therefore, we need to represent a state
of a challenge with a vector of n features. The methodology
we follow for features extraction derives from the procedure
described in [16], but with a significant difference in the
computation of features values. Indeed, we need to represent
Boolean matrices (i.e., black and white) instead of gray-scale
matrices. The idea consists of dividing a matrix Mk into a set
T kω of squared tiles. The parameter ω is the amount of pixels
in a tile side. For each considered value of ω, we build a
vector Fω =< f1, .., fn > of reference tiles. In particular, we
empirically select n = 3ω. From now on, we refer to h(t1, t2)
as the Hamming distance between two Boolean matrices t1
and t2 (i.e., two tiles). The tiles in the vector Fω must be
different from each other. For this reason, we apply k-mean
clustering method on a training set of candidate tiles with side
ω, using K = n and h as similarity metric. At the end of the
clustering procedure, we obtain a vector Fω , where fi ∈ Fω
is a tile that represents the centroid of the ith cluster. We
compute the values of a vector Dkω =< d
k
1 , .., d
k
n >, where
each value is defined as follows:
dki = |{t ∈ T kω : fi = argmin
l∈Fω
h(l, t)}|, ∀i = 1, .., n.
The values in the features vectors Dkω are normalized, from 0
to 1. In practical terms, for a fixed ω, this procedure produces
a vector of features Dzω , starting from a cursor position z that
corresponds to the state Sz .
2) Classifiers training: We trained Random Forest (RF) and
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers with 4000 random
challenges (with ψ = 70% and δ = 7). For implementation of
the classifiers, we use a RF classifier with 60 Decision trees
estimators, and we use an SVM classifier with Radial Basis
Function (RBF) as the kernel function. We use these classifiers
to perform a binary classification, i.e., they recognize examples
of two classes: solution and non-solution. For each challenge,
we generate 400 states (this means a training set of 1.6 · 106
examples). We train a classifier for each value of ω.
We underline that an attacker has to build this training
set manually, i.e., we have access to the exact solution of
a challenge, while an adversary can retrieve this information
only by solving the challenge legitimately. Moreover, we also
know the value of usability tolerance parameter, which allows
us to provide the neighbors of the solution to the classifier.
3) Attacks design and performance: In the following, we
discuss the design of two attacks that use the classifiers trained
in the previous phase. We evaluated the attacks as the value
of parameter ω changes. For the sake of attack feasibility (in
terms of both memory and time), we limited the research space
to a subset of K possible cursor positions coordinates, defined
as:
Kλ = {(λx, λy) : ∀x, y ∈ N ∩ [0, 300/λ]}.
We set the parameter λ = 5 pixels (i.e., the same value as the
usability tolerance), in order to ensure that we have at least
one solution among all the states. After this procedure, we
obtain a set of Kλ cursor positions. For each classifier with
a specific ω, we define Cω as the function that evaluates the
probability that a given state Sk belongs to the class solution.
We recall that a challenge admits only one answer, and it
is final and irrevocable. We observed experimentally that the
distribution of values for function Cω often presents multiple
local maximums and large plateaus. For this reason, an attacker
must find the cursor position ksol that corresponds to a global
maximum for the function Cω:
ksol = argmax
k∈Kλ
Cω(S
k).
In this evaluation, we ran the attacks on a test set of 200
challenges (with ψ = 70% and δ = 7), for each considered
value of ω. We executed the attacks on a high end PC
with a 3.16 GHz Intel Xeon X5460 and 32 GB of RAM.
Figure 12a and Figure 12b report the success rate and the
average execution time to perform these attacks, respectively.
The attack with the best success rate uses the SVM classifier
with ω = 15, and it achieves a success rate of 78.1% (as
reported in Figure 12a).
(a) Success rate.
(b) Average execution time.
Fig. 12: Success rate and average execution time for machine
learning-based attacks, varying the tile size (ω).
The time required to build the features vectors Dkω, ∀k ∈
Kλ, remains stable at around 340 seconds. On one hand, the
time required to compute the probability values Cω(Sk), ∀k ∈
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Kλ, increases linearly using SVM classifier, according to the
value of ω. On the other hand, this time remains under two
seconds using RF. This means that an attack on a single
challenge will have some 78% of success rate, but it will
require 421 seconds to be performed. We recall that a human
user can solve a challenge with a success rate of more than
90% in an average time of 27 seconds (56 seconds in the
worst case). Therefore, the problem for a bot of automatically
recognizing a solution state of a challenge of CAPTCHaStar
is hard to treat in a limited amount of time and resources. We
underline that, as recently reported in [6], machine learning
based attacks achieve some 50% success rate in only two
seconds against Baidu and eBay CAPTCHAs.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first compare our solution with other
image-based CAPTCHAs (Section VI-A), then we discuss
limitations of CAPTCHaStar (Section VI-B) and finally we
discuss some future work (Section VI-C).
A. Comparison with other image-based CAPTCHAs
Comparing our solution with the state-of-the-art of image-
based CAPTCHAs (presented in Section II-B), our proposal
turns out to be more resilient against attacks. In particular,
Table V reports the comparison considering the common
weaknesses of image-based CAPTCHAs, previously discussed
in Section II-B. In the table we indicate whether the design
is protected against the following attacks: indirect attack,
exhaustion of DB, leak of DB, and pure relay attack. In
addition, for stream relay attack and machine learning based
attacks, we report the cost to perform such attack, in terms of
computational time and resources.
We notice that most of the designs in the literature limit
their focus to a specific threat, but they offer less protection
against others. On the other hand, our proposal is designed to
resist all of them, while maintaining a high usability level.
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Asirra [11] 3 3 7 7 low low 0.02%
Collage [35] 3 7 7 7 low high 16.60%
Deep [27] 3 3 3 7 low high 0.20%
Motion [36] 3 7 7 3 low high 25.00%
Video [20] 3 3 7 7 low high 0.30%
Noise [29] 3 3 3 3 mid mid ∼ 0.00%
Cursor [38] 3 3 3 3 low low ∼ 0.00%
Jigsaw [14] 3 7 7 7 low mid 6.66%
PlayThru [1] 7 7 7 3 high high ∼ 0.00%
CAPTCHaStar 3 3 3 3 high high 0.09%
TABLE V: Protection against the threats in Section II-B.
B. Limitations
Unfortunately, we (as well as other CAPTCHA proposers)
are not able to prove that our CAPTCHA is secure against
all the possible attacks. We believe the best a researcher can
do in such cases is to consider both current traditional attacks
(see our Section V-A) and ad-hoc ones (see our sections V-B
and V-C). As an example, Asirra [11] has been later proven to
be breakable [16], [45]. The same goes for other CAPTCHAs,
such as ReCaptcha (both versions of 2011 and 2013) and the
ones employed by CNN, Wikipedia, Yahoo, Microsoft [42]
and PlayThru [1].
In this paper, we evaluated the attacks that we were able to
think up with our best efforts. Such evaluation suggests that
our proposal is still more resilient than some state-of-the-art
CAPTCHAs. Indeed, BAIDU and eBay CAPTCHAs can be
broken with a success rate of 50% in just two seconds [7]).
We demonstrated that the problem of classifying an arrange-
ment of dots as forming a shape or not is learnable by a SVM
classifier. However, as shown by the attack evaluation reported
in Section V-C: the bottleneck for an attack, that uses such
shape recognition as a building block, is the generation of
the sampled search space (i.e., the possible configurations by
varying the mouse coordinates). Finally, such complexity can
be further increased by enlarging the drawable space (also
reducing the success rate of random chance attack).
C. Future work
As a future work, we plan to further increase the resiliency
of CAPTCHaStar by analyzing the pattern of mouse move-
ments during the resolution of a challenge. We believe this
analysis will be meaningful in order to better discriminate
human users and automatic programs.
Moreover, we intend to perform some qualitative experi-
ments in the laboratory, especially to evaluate the usability
on mobile devices. However, we highlight that CAPTCHaStar
already takes into account the recommendations to improve
CAPTCHA usability on smartphones, recently proposed by
Chiasson et al. in [34]. In fact, our proposal has the following
properties, which are desirable features for CAPTCHAs on a
smartphone:
• Our design focuses only on a single task, avoiding
optional features.
• The input mechanism of CAPTCHaStar on touch-enabled
devices (described in Section III-D) is cross-platform,
and it does not interfere with normal operations of the
browser.
• It is possible to isolate CAPTCHaStar from the rest of
the web form.
• CAPTCHaStar minimizes bandwidth usage. Indeed, the
data transmission with the server is limited to the ex-
change of trajectories parameters of the stars, and the
verification of the user final answer.
• Our design does not require any additional feature nor
library to be installed on the browser.
Finally, we plan to investigate the possibility of leveraging
additional gaps between human abilities and automatic pro-
grams. For example, we intend to involve in a challenge the
semantic meaning of the final shape. This means to rely on
the innate human ability to relate objects with their semantic.
In fact, nowadays this ability is hardly imitable by a ma-
chine [45]. We strongly believe that improving CAPTCHaStar
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challenges in this way will further increase the resiliency of
our proposal against machine learning-based attacks.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed CAPTCHaStar, a novel image-
based CAPTCHA that leverages the innate human ability
to recognize shapes in a confused environment [19]. Our
study demonstrates that our proposal meets both security and
usability requirements for a good CAPTCHA design.
We described in detail our prototype implementation and
the selection of parameters involved in challenge generation.
Data collected from our user study confirmed the usability
of our proposal. Indeed, users were able to obtain a success
rate higher than 90%, which is better than the success rates of
CAPTCHAs currently used in websites [7] such as mail.ru and
Microsoft. Finally, the majority of the users who participated
in our survey preferred CAPTCHaStar over classical text-
based CAPTCHAs. These results motivate further research in
this direction.
In this paper, we also assessed the resiliency of CAPTCHa-
Star against traditional and automated ad-hoc attacks. Indeed,
these attacks were shown to be ineffective (for a proper
setting of our parameters). We also performed an attack
leveraging a machine learning classifier, which we optimized
by reducing as much as possible the research space. Despite
this optimization of the attack and its execution on a high end
PC, the resulting average execution time is still unacceptable,
i.e., more than six minutes to find the solution for a single
challenge (with a success probability of 79%). We recall
that users are able to complete CAPTCHaStar challenges in
an average time of less than 27 seconds (with a success
probability of some 90%). Furthermore we recall that attacks
to the state of the art CAPTCHAs take only two seconds [6]
(with a probability of some 50%).
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